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1. INTRODUCTION
Very sincere thanks to the discussants for choosing
to enter a virtual minefield of disagreement in the
development history of statistics. For we just need
to recall the remark that fiducial is Fisher’s “biggest
blunder” and place it alongside the fact that fidu-
cial was the initial step toward confidence, which
arguably is the most substantive ingredient in mod-
ern model-based theory: the two differ in minor de-
velopmental detail, with fiducial offering a probabil-
ity distribution as does Bayes and with confidence
offering just probabilities for intervals and special
regions. Statistics has spent far more time attack-
ing incremental steps than it has seeking insightful
resolutions.
As a modern discipline statistics has inherited two
prominent approaches to the analysis of models with
data; of course such is not all of statistics but is
a critical portion that influences the discipline widely.
How can a discipline, central to science and to crit-
ical thinking, have two methodologies, two logics,
two approaches that frequently give substantially
different answers to the same problems. Any astute
person from outside would say, “Why don’t they put
their house in order?” And any serious mathemati-
cian would surely ask how you could use a lemma
with one premise missing by making up an ingredi-
ent and thinking that the conclusions of the lemma
were still available. Of course, the two approaches
have been around since 1763 and 1930 with regular
disagreement and yet no sense of urgency to clarify
the conflicts. And now even a tired discipline can
just ask, “Who wants to face those old questions?”:
a fully understandable reaction! But is complacency
in the face of contradiction acceptable for a central
discipline of science?
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A statistical model differs from a deterministic
model in having added probability structure that
describes the variability typically present in most
applications. So, in an application with a statistical
model and related data it would then seem quite
natural that that variability would enter the con-
clusions concerning the unknowns in an application:
what do I know deterministically, and what do I
know probabilistically?
And that is what Bayes proposed in 1763: prob-
ability statements concerning the unknowns of an
investigation. Many have had doubts and said there
was no merit in the proposal; and many have ac-
ceded and became strong believers. And then Fisher
(1930) also offered probabilities concerning the un-
knowns of an investigation, but by a different argu-
ment, and the turf fight began! Bayes had hesitantly
examined a special problem and added a random
generator for the unknown parameter, and Fisher
had worked more generally and used just the ran-
domness that had generated the data itself.
But then a third person, Lindley (1958), from the
same country said that the second person, Fisher,
couldn’t use the term probability for the unknowns
in an investigation, as the term was already taken
by the first person, Bayes. And strangely the disci-
pline complied! Decades went by and anecdotes were
traded and things were often vitriolic.
2. WHAT DOES THE ORACLE SAY?
Consider some regular statistical model f(y; θ),
together with a lower β-confidence bound θˆβ(y), and
also a lower β-posterior bound θ˜(y) based on a prior
pi(θ): What does the oracle see concerning the us-
age of these bounds? He can investigate any long
sequence of usages of the model, and He would have
available the data values yi and of course the preced-
ing parameter values θi that produced the yi values;
He would thus have access to {(θi, yi) : i= 1,2, . . .}.
First consider the lower confidence bound. The or-
acle knows whether or not the θi is in the confidence
interval (θˆβ(yi),∞), and He can examine the long-
run proportion of true statements among the asser-
tions that θi is in the confidence interval (θˆβ(yi),∞),
and He can see whether the confidence claim of a β-
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proportion true is correct. In agreement with the
mathematics of confidence, that proportion is just β.
Now consider the lower posterior bound. The or-
acle knows whether θi is in the posterior interval
(θ˜β(yi),∞), and He can examine the long-run pro-
portion of true statements that θi is in the poste-
rior interval (θ˜β(yi),∞). Now suppose the long-run
pattern of θi values just happened to correspond to
the pattern pi(θ); then in full agreement with the
mathematics of the Bayes calculation, the Oracle
would see that long-run proportion of true state-
ments among assertions that θi is in the posterior in-
terval (θ˜β(yi),∞) was correct, was just the stated β.
But what if the long-run pattern of θi values was
different from the introduced pi(θ) pattern? Then in
wide generality the long-run proportion of true sta-
tements among assertions that θi is in the posterior
interval (θ˜β(yi),∞) would not be β! In other words,
the confidence procedure is always right, and the
Bayes procedure is typically wrong, unless the prior
was guessed correctly. Seems like a poor trade-off!
Now consider further what a prior actually does
in producing parameter bounds or quantiles that
are different from the confidence bound. From an
asymptotic viewpoint a prior can be expanded as
exp(aθ/n1/2 + cθ2/n) to the third order, as men-
tioned but not pursued in Section 6(iv). This pro-
vides a direct displacement of the confidence bound
in standardized units and produces an O(1)-shift
away from the claimed β value, either up or down
depending on the sign of a! Hardly an argument for
using the Bayes procedure unless there was some
very urgent need for a quick and dirty calculation.
3. RESPONSE TO THE DISCUSSANTS
Christian Robert
Christian presents a very committed Bayes view-
point and quite correctly admonishes me for not dis-
tinguishing what Thomas Bayes did and what has
followed in the same theme. But going beyond the
minor detail, Bayes added a distribution for a pa-
rameter, a distribution that was not part of the bi-
nomial example under consideration and then used
that distribution for probability analysis. And much
of modern Bayesian statistics does precisely that: in-
troduces an artifact distribution for expediency or
convenience and then works reassuringly within ac-
cepted probability calculus. Indeed, this is the pri-
mary theme of the article: adding something arbi-
trary gives something arbitrary no matter how at-
tractive the material labeled probability might or
might not be, or no matter what might be available
by other methods of analysis. If one faces a probabi-
lity-type claim, it is fair enough to simulate and eval-
uate the claim, and that is what coverage probability
is all about, as the invincible Oracle well knows.
The marginalization paradoxes do appear in the
literature but are widely neglected and not “exten-
sively discussed” as Christian suggests. They apply
to any proposal for a distribution to describe an un-
known vector parameter, whether obtained by the
Bayes inversion of a density or the frequentist in-
version of a pivot, such as fiducial, confidence struc-
tural or other. There is an immutable contradiction
built into the hope to describe a vector parameter
by a distribution. Curvature of an interest parame-
ter has emerged as the critical source for this con-
tradiction. Take a bivariate parameter, a data point
and an interest parameter value: if the parameter
is linear, the confidence and the Bayes values are
equal; if then parameter curvature is introduced, we
have that the confidence value and the Bayes value
change in opposite directions! One has the cover-
age property and the “other” acquires bias at twice
the rate of the departure from linearity. And the
“other” uses the name probability with an assertive-
ness coming from the use of the probability calculus,
conveniently overlooking that an artifact was intro-
duced in place of the input needed for the validity
of the probability calculus for the application.
Maybe it is time to address the Pandora’s box and
check for a Madoff pyramid: too good to be true.
Larry Wasserman
Larry presents a pragmatic view of the Bayes ap-
proach, acknowledging its rich flexibility but recom-
mending coverage cautions. His five examples are
most welcome concerning the wider spheres of ap-
plication and he is to be complemented on the skill-
ful innovations. I do quarrel, however, with his rein-
forcement of personality cults in statistics. It seems
that statistics has suffered greatly from this exter-
nalization of the scientific method, as if there were
different flavors of scientific thinking and mathemat-
ical logic and that these might gain concreteness
when personalized.
Kesar Singh and Minge Xie
Confidence for estimation and exploration? It is
deeply unfortunate that statistics chooses at many
steps to malign its major innovators, for example,
Fisher with his “biggest blunder” as a referent for
the initiative that gave us confidence. What Fisher
didn’t do was present his major innovations in a fully
packaged form ready to withstand a few centuries of
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challenges and modification: What? We still have to
do a little bit of thinking! Tough! He clearly must
generously have expected others to have his insight
and wisdom!
Fiducial, confidence, structural or other? It is just
pivot inversion with variation in context, conditions
or interpretation: the big risk was described by Da-
wid, Stone and Zidek (1973) and curvature is now
identified as the prime cause. To have different na-
mes to fine tune for different applications or different
explorations would seem to take emphasis away from
the proper calibration of the tool, as the primary
concern for most applications.
Statistics routinely combines likelihoods as appro-
priate, so it is not correct to attribute this to Baye-
sian learning; perhaps the central sectors of statis-
tics were just slow to glamorize the good things in
their statistical modeling. Putting a prior on a like-
lihood is a different operation downstream from as-
sembling the likelihood in the relevant broader con-
text, although it does seem convenient for the Bayes
approach to co-opt it as their own contribution when
it was somewhat neglected by the “others.”
Tong Zhang
Where does the pivot come from? Fisher’s de-
velopment of confidence or whatever attracted the
mathematicians’ criticisms, mostly because it wasn’t
proposed in a fully developed form. It was then shred-
ded, fully ignoring the emerging recognition of its
innovative genius. Certainly the need to clarify the
origin of the key ingredient, “the pivot,” is of fun-
damental importance, as Tong suggests: using all
the data in an appropriately balanced way, respect-
ing continuity and parameter direction from data,
and more. Whether these should be bundled under
a term optimality may be questionable, but doesn’t
diminish the importance of the individual criteria;
for some recent emphasis on continuity see Fraser,
Fraser and Staicu (2010).
4. SOME CONCLUDING INVOCATIVE
REMARKS
An inference distribution for a vector parameter
is inherently a contradiction. Information from two
different sources can be reported separately, with
combination not by principle. Combining likelihoods
is a consequence of combining models, typically fol-
lowing from independence; the Bayes claim that it
comes from the use of the Bayes argument is after
the fact and disingenuous. Inverting a density and
inverting a pivot are different except in the linear
case, but the first can sometimes approximate the
second.
The question was asked: “Is Bayes posterior just
quick and dirty confidence?” And the case was made
for “Yes”: Bayes posterior is just quick and dirty
confidence: quick in the sense of easier than using
quantiles to determine how θ affects data; and ap-
proximate in the sense of a wide spread need to use
approximation methods.
Not everyone liked the blunt question. One dis-
cussion expresses discomfort with such a direct con-
frontation to the Bayes approach; one discussion
adds additional support examples; and the two re-
maining discussions speak more to methods and mod-
ifications of confidence distributions, overlooking the
risks. But no one argued that the use of the condi-
tional probability lemma with an imaginary input
had powers beyond confidence, supernatural pow-
ers.
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